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ABSTRACT 
 
 
    The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Dryden Flight 
Research Center completed flight testing of adaptive controls research on 
a full-scale F-18 testbed.  The validation of adaptive controls has the 
potential to enhance safety in the presence of adverse conditions such as 
structural damage or control surface failures.  This paper describes the 
research interface architecture, risk mitigations, flight test approach and 
lessons learned of adaptive controls research. 
 
 
NOMENCLATURE 
 
 
1553 Mil-Std-1553 data bus 
68040 research flight control computer  
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20110024034 2019-08-30T18:24:04+00:00Z
Page 2 of 15 
 
701E production flight control computer processor 
ARTS IV Airborne Research Test System, 4
th
 Generation 
CAT Choose-A-Test 
DAG Dial-A-Gain 
DDI digital display indicator 
DFRC Dryden Flight Research Center 
DPRAM dual-port random access memory 
FAST Full-scale Advanced Systems Testbed 
FCC flight control computer 
HUD head-up display 
IRAC Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control 
IFCS Intelligent Flight Control System 
KIAS knots indicated airspeed 
MRAC model reference adaptive control 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NDI nonlinear dynamic inversion 
OBES On-Board Excitation System 
PVI pilot-vehicle interface 
RFCS research flight control system 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
    The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Dryden 
Flight Research Center (DFRC) (Edwards, California) completed adaptive 
flight control research flight-testing in January 2011 in support of the 
Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control (IRAC) project as a follow-on effort of 
the Intelligent Flight Control System (IFCS) project also conducted at 
DFRC
1
.  The validation of adaptive controls has the potential to enhance 
safety in the presence of adverse conditions such as structural damage or 
control surface failures.   
 
    Challenges were addressed through the design and flight test of a model 
reference adaptive controller (MRAC), a closed-loop controller with varying 
parameters that are continuously updated to change the response of the 
system to a known response.  Its purpose was to evaluate whether a very 
simple adaptive control algorithm can be adequately tested using 
traditional flight qualification methods and still serve as a useful level of 
safety enhancement to flight control.  Key aspects of the technology were 
investigated such as the assessment of an appropriate level of complexity 
through pilot evaluations of handling qualities and the exploration of 
unanticipated human-algorithm interactions.   
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RESEARCH CONFIGURATION 
 
 
    Two major hardware upgrades to the Full-scale Advanced Systems 
Testbed (FAST) included the modification of flight control computers 
(FCCs) and the integration of two dual-redundant, fourth-generation 
Airborne Research Test Systems (ARTS IV).  
 
 
    Flight control computer modifications - Standard F-18 FCCs are quad-
redundant and incorporate 701E processors.
2
 Previous Active Aeroelastic 
Wing
3
 project modifications incorporated a Motorola 68040 research 
processor (Motorola Solutions, Inc., Schaumburg, Illinois) into each 
channel of the FCCs and dual-port random access memory (DPRAM), and 
software interfacing between the 701E (production processors) and 68040 
(research processors). The research 68040 hardware and software 
combination comprises the research flight control system (RFCS).   
 
 
    Airborne Research Test System IV - Two dual-redundant ARTS IV units 
provide the flexibility needed for quick software development, testing, 
integration, and validation.  The units augment the RFCS by providing 
external input/output, internal memory, and additional processing power.  
The general research interface architecture interfacing with the RFCS and 
ARTS IV systems is shown in figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Simplified diagram of the research interface architecture. 
 
    Further design features include a pilot-vehicle interface (PVI) installed 
below the upfront controls in the cockpit that provides visual feedback to 
the pilot by means of a 2-by-20-character backlit Liquid Crystal Display 
(LCD).  The PVI displays ARTS IV interpretations of proper experiment 
selection inputs, experiment modes, system status, and ARTS IV health 
messages.  
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EXPERIMENT MODES, STATES, AND EXPERIMENT CAPABILITIES 
 
 
    Several experimental modes, states, and experiment capabilities are 
available that further facilitate flexible yet safe flight-test evaluation of 
adaptive control technologies.  
 
 
    Experimental modes - The research control laws have the ability to run 
in three research experiment modes: 1) RFCS Primary, 2) RFCS/ARTS 
mixed mode, and 3) ARTS Primary.  In RFCS Primary mode, the F-18 
production control laws are replicated within the RFCS to provide surface 
and throttle commands to the 701E while ignoring all ARTS IV commands.  
In the RFCS/ARTS mixed mode, surface and throttle commands from the 
RFCS replication control laws are merged with commands from the ARTS 
IV and sent to the 701E.  In ARTS Primary mode, the ARTS IV performs all 
control law calculations internally and ARTS IV control surface and throttle 
commands replace RFCS control law commands.  In all modes; however, 
the RFCS safety monitors all commands.  These three distinct modes 
allow for a safe build-up approach to validate the supportability of the 
hardware and software to host adaptive control technologies. 
 
 
    RFCS states - There are three RFCS states which ultimately describe 
the transfer of control between the 701E and the RFCS: 1) disengaged, 2) 
armed, and 3) engaged. In the armed state, the 68040 processor begins to 
generate replication control law commands while the 701E retains control 
over the primary flight control system.  In the engaged state, command of 
aircraft control is handed over from the 701E to the RFCS.  
Disengagement occurs automatically through software monitoring or 
manually by the pilot using one of several options available in the cockpit.  
Ultimately, the three-state transfer improves pilot authority over the 
sequencing of control transfer and improves situational awareness of the 
state of operations during test.   
 
 
    Experiment capabilities - Each experiment mode offers selectable 
experiment capabilities within the RFCS and ARTS. A primary capability of 
the RFCS includes replicated F-18 production control laws.  The replicated 
control laws were used to conduct back-to-back flight dynamics 
comparisons with the 701E to ensure that the RFCS did not introduce any 
undesirable effects.  On-Board Excitation System (OBES) capabilities 
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added programmed digital signals to the RFCS and ARTS control system 
actuator commands for excitation of aircraft dynamics.  Five combinations 
of simulated control surface failures are also programmed into the RFCS 
with the addition of four varying levels of simulated damaged wing 
scenarios.
4
 Each was designed to present varying levels of challenging yet 
controllable failure scenarios.  The ARTS hosted Pass-Thru experiments, 
which receive control surface commands generated within the RFCS, but 
not initially sent to the 701E.  Instead, the ARTS IV passes the commands 
back to the RFCS unaltered before being read by the 701E.  
   
 
     Experiment selection - The experiment capabilities residing in the RFCS 
and ARTS IV units are selected by the pilot through Dial-a-Gain (DAG) and 
Choose-a-Test (CAT) entries using the standard F-18 digital display 
indicators (DDI)s in the cockpit.  The DDI buttons representing “B,” “C,” 
and “D” are used to select a particular experiment capability correlating to 
predefined DAG (0-26) and CAT (0-26) number pair sequences stored in 
memory.  Dial-a-Gain entries are used to select the controlling experiment 
mode.  The first DAG (DAG 0) is reserved for RFCS Primary mode testing 
where the RFCS maintains sole control over the vehicle control surface 
actuator and throttle commands.  The remaining DAG entries reside in 
either the RFCS/ARTS or ARTS Primary mode.  Table 1(a) outlines the 
DAG flight configurations available for each experimental mode.  Choose-
a-Test entries are used to activate specific experiments.  Table 1(b) 
outlines the CAT flight configurations available for each experimental 
mode.  In the case that no DAG/CAT combination is entered, the default 
selection is DAG 0 CAT 0 indicating that no OBES inputs or simulated 
failures are activated and only replicated F-18 control laws are produced. 
   
 
Table 1(a). Dial-A-Gain flight configurations.  
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Table 1(b). Choose-A-Test flight configurations. 
 
 
RISK MITIGATION TECHNIQUES 
 
    Risk management involves the identification of risks; assessment of their 
impact; and the implementation of tailored mitigations to minimize, monitor, 
or eliminate the credibility of risk.  Effective risk management can control 
the probability, or impact, or both to test successes.  Several risk 
mitigations implemented for this research are discussed below. 
 
 
    Designing out risk - To reduce pilot workload and improve situational 
awareness, much of the flight test risk was designed out of the research 
architecture and flight test approach.  Two main design techniques used 
was the implementation of a “Class B” envelope and a DFRC developed 
ARTS “floating limiter.” 
    Flight-testing while in RFCS armed or engaged states was restricted to a 
predefined DFRC flight envelope termed “Class B” (figure 2).  Analysis 
showed that test points within the Class B envelope would not allow 
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transients to exceed aircraft load limits should a “hard-over” (maximum rate 
deflection of a control surface to its position limit) occur. Operating within 
this flight envelope minimizes structural concerns while providing sufficient 
altitude for recovery from unusual attitudes thus bounding risk to an 
acceptable level.   
 
 
Figure 2. Class B envelope. 
    
    The Class B envelope was enforced automatically by RFCS software 
disengagement limits.  Although these limits were monitored in the mission 
control center real-time, software-enforced limits reduced dependency on 
pilot reaction time to disengage the system if the airplane exited the 
envelope.  Further plans are in work to open up the flight-test envelope due 
to the successful conclusions of the FAST project.   
    
    A DFRC-designed software feature called a “floating limiter” was 
implemented into the ARTS for further mitigation to limit the potential for 
hard-overs.  Within the floating limiter (figure 3), a maximum rate of change 
is designed into the limiter.  When a signal exceeds its specified maximum 
drift rate, the floating limiter boundary is hit and this signal is rate-limited, 
thus preventing a maximum rate deflection of the control surfaces to their 
position limit.  
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Figure 3. Floating limiter diagram. 
 
 
    Improving situational awareness - Flight test card development and test 
point sequencing served as another example of “designing-out” risk.  
Several verification checkpoints were incorporated into the flight test cards 
at key test point execution stages.  For example, DDI entries for 
experiment capability selection and state transitions, and NWS inputs for 
RFCS engagement were performed with step-by-step verification 
checkpoints between the pilot and control room personnel.  This helped 
ensure proper situational awareness of both the pilot and mission control 
center personnel.  Verification checkpoints also provided an expected 
audible cadence that became indicative of flight testing free of unexpected 
events.  This served as a metric to evaluate team situational awareness 
and readiness when an unexpected event occurred which threw-off the 
typical cadence.  Specific recommendation is made to incorporate cadence 
metrics, when appropriate, to obtain human factor cues that can indicate 
stress risers, which may affect flight-test safety or efficiency.  
 
 
    Use of simulation - The DFRC simulation was as a build-up tool for flight 
planning and familiarization for both the pilots and key control room 
personnel.  Additional pilots with varying input gain (based on amplitude) 
were trained and incorporated into the flight-test regime to obtain a more 
well-rounded collection of research experiment evaluation feedback.  
Training incorporated research control and system engineers as well as 
the mission controller to exercise expected test point cadence and 
prompting.  Chase pilots were also brought into the simulation training to 
hear real-time flight-test prompts and visually assess expected transients 
of the research aircraft.   
    Despite the recognized benefits of the simulation for research 
verification and familiarization of tasks, a lesson learned was identified 
during flight testing that highlighted a shortfall of our approach.  Often, test 
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point evaluation in the simulation omitted in-flight test point set-up 
maneuvering much outside the boundaries of the test point.  In flight, 
nuisances described as “pitch bobbles” were found while setting up for air-
to-air tracking task maneuvers during flight testing.  This finding highlighted 
the potential for unrealized safety issues if simulation testing is too 
narrowly scoped.  When appropriate, control law algorithm testing should 
incorporate safety-of-flight verification of test-point set-up maneuvers in 
preparation for unanticipated human-algorithm interactions between test 
points. 
 
 
FLIGHT-TEST APPROACH AND RESULTS 
 
 
    A general build-up approach to verification and validation is shown in 
table 2.  The schedule incorporated iterations of software development, 
simulation testing, ground testing, and flights of each system capability: 
RFCS, RFCS/ARTS, ARTS, NDI, and MRAC.   
 
 
Table 2. Verification and Validation schedule of the Full-scale Advanced 
Systems Testbed. 
 
 
    RFCS and ARTS checkouts - Initial RFCS Primary in-flight checks 
repeated validation of arming (including failed arming attempts), disarming, 
engagement, and both manual and automatic disengagement attempts 
specific to the RFCS.  Flight dynamic maneuvers such as doublets, pitch, 
and bank captures; steady-heading sideslips; 360-degree rolls; 2-g loaded 
rolls; and 2.5-g wind-up turns were flown in order to investigate closed-loop 
control characteristics of the research architecture.  Back-to-back 
comparisons of the flight dynamics maneuvers using the 701E control laws 
compared to the RFCS control laws were performed to confirm that the 
RFCS control laws provided proper replication.  Further testing included a 
subset of OBES maneuvers and simulated failures programmed into the 
RFCS. RFCS/ARTS mixed mode validated proper PVI operation and the 
execution of an ARTS IV controlling experiment.  The ARTS Primary mode 
was exercised using the ARTS IV Pass-Thru experiment capability (DAG 
Page 10 of 15 
 
26, CAT 0).  This experiment validated ARTS IV operation, timing, failure 
annunciation, and integration of the ARTS IV units with the 701E-RFCS 
system.  
    Results of the RFCS and ARTS checkout flights showed that RFCS and 
ARTS software behaved as expected with only minor discrepancies noted.  
Overall, results showed good flight-to-simulation match.  Completion of the 
research mode flight tests laid the groundwork for follow-on flight-testing of 
NDI and MRAC controllers. 
 
 
    Handling qualities task development - Handling qualities tasks were 
used to evaluate predicted improvements to tracking performance and 
coupling between the axes and whether such improvements imposed 
tradeoffs of other aircraft flying qualities.  
    In-trail formation flight and 2-g tracking tasks were chosen because of 
pilot familiarity with the task, ability to be accomplished within the Class B 
envelope, and simultaneous longitudinal and lateral inputs, which allowed 
for the evaluation of control harmony between axes and investigation of 
potential undesirable axes coupling.  An additional benefit of evaluating the 
in-trail formation task was its similarity to a typical refueling maneuver that 
a damaged operational airplane may need to encounter while utilizing 
adaptive control technologies.   
 
    The set-up of the in-trail formation started with the pilot aligning a 
canopy centerline indicator with the tail hook of the lead aircraft.  After 
simultaneous axes input (gross acquisition), the pilot targeted placement of 
the left head-up-display (HUD) bracket corner to be visually aligned with 
the missile rail tip of the lead aircraft (fine tracking).  The depiction of the 
set-up and maneuvering is shown in figure 4.  Table 3 outlines the 
performance criteria associated with the tasks of which were based purely 
upon pilot opinion.   
 
Figure 4. In-trail tracking task set-up and maneuvering. 
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Table 3. Performance criteria for in-trail formation task. 
     
    The 2-g air-to-air tracking tasks were performed using the air-to-ground 
reticle set to 140 mils deflection in the HUD.  With approximately 1,000 ft 
nose-tail separation, the task began with an initial 2-g turn by both aircraft.  
Once the test aircraft was ready, the pilot would direct the lead aircraft to 
reverse the direction of turn.  Once the lead aircraft reversed directions, 
air-to-air gross acquisition would begin followed by fine tracking using the 
piper.  The depiction of the set-up and maneuvering is shown in figure 6.
5
  
Performance criteria for air-to-air tracking tasks are outlined in table 5.   
 
 
Figure 5. Air-to-air task set-up. 
 
 
Table 4. Performance criteria for air-to-air tracking task. 
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    Nonlinear Dynamic Inversion - A non-adaptive, NDI control law was 
loaded into the ARTS IV system for flight-test validation as the baseline 
control law to enable follow-on MRAC flight testing and validation to 
evaluate the system’s ability to handle closed-loop control law logic.  
Nonlinear Dynamic Inversion is a technique for control law design based 
on feedback linearization to achieve desired dynamic response 
characteristics while accounting for real-world vehicle dynamics.
6  
 
 
    As with the RFCS and ARTS flight testing, basic flying qualities of the 
NDI were assessed using typical test maneuvers.  Experiment 
configurations were selected to show that the NDI control law was robust 
enough to remain controllable for a variety of simulated failure conditions.
6
   
 
    In-trail formation flight tasks and 2-g air-to-air tracking tasks were 
performed for both gross acquisition and fine tracking.  Task performance 
was evaluated by the pilots using Cooper-Harper and pilot-induced 
oscillation rating scales.
7
 Specific tracking performance requirements and 
desired handling qualities were targeted to verify that handling qualities 
and reference model tracking was adequate to allow NDI to be used as a 
baseline control law to compare follow-on MRAC, having provided 
equivalent ratings between the actual system and the design reference 
model.   
 
   Overall NDI behavior showed equivalent baseline control law handling 
qualities aside from minor deficiencies such as heavier stick forces and un-
loading during roll maneuvers.
7
 Success of the baseline NDI controller 
gave the green light to proceed with in-flight demonstration of the strengths 
and weaknesses of a simple textbook model reference adaptive controller. 
 
 
    Model reference adaptive controller - Conventional methods for 
verification and validation testing of flight controls software rely upon 
predictable responses to test scenarios and are ensured by control gains 
that are either fixed or scheduled.  However, adaptive flight controls 
incorporate time-varying gains.  These varying gain values are harder to 
predict and impose difficulty in flight qualification to a safety-critical level.  
In response to this difficulty, the MRAC experiment was designed to 
evaluate whether a very simple adaptive control algorithm can be 
adequately tested using traditional flight qualification methods and still 
serve as a useful level of safety enhancement to flight control. 
 
    The MRAC contains three modes of varying levels of complexity.
8
 The 
simplest control mode (sMRAC) has a single adaptive gain in each of the 
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pitch and roll axes.  The second control mode (onMRAC) retains the same 
number of adaptive gains while introducing additional complexity into the 
algorithm that adjusts the values of the gains in response to undesirable 
aircraft dynamics.  The third control mode (onMRAC+) adds a second 
adaptive gain in each axis to account for failures or damage scenarios that 
exhibit undesirable coupling between the axes.  Each controller mode was 
evaluated against a suite of simulated failures, ranging from changes to the 
aircraft's pitch and roll damping to failures that introduced significant 
coupling between the axes.  Flight-test maneuvers and handling qualities 
evaluations were also performed with tasks similar to the NDI flight-test 
regime across five pilots and ten research flights.
8/9
  
 
    The predefined 2-g air-to-air maneuvers were flown during all MRAC 
complexity modes.  In general, all three complexity modes showed 
improvement in tracking error for reductions in both pitch and roll damping 
over the previously tested NDI controller
8
.  Performance between adaptive 
controllers was barely distinguishable during reduced pitch damping 
testing, yet improved with complexity for reduced roll damping failures.
8
  
Handling qualities showed that the MRAC+ mode provided consistently 
better ratings than the other two modes.  However, when compared to the 
healthy aircraft state, the MRAC+ mode showed degraded handling 
qualities and increased pilot workload.
8
  With respect to roll to pitch input 
coupling, flight test results show reduced coupling and improved handling 
qualities ratings with increased MRAC complexity that were equivalent to a 
healthy aircraft state
9
. 
 
 
LESSONS LEARNED 
 
 
1. Design-out unnecessary risk to prevent excessive mitigation 
management during flight test. 
 
2. Audible test card checkpoints can serve as a metric to assess test 
readiness real-time among the flight-test team. 
 
3. Consider the total flight-test profile to uncover unanticipated human-
algorithm interactions during simulation testing, as appropriate. 
 
4. A wide range of pilots with varying pilot techniques will be needed to 
study pilot-controller interactions. 
 
5. Full-scale flight test is critical to the development, maturation and 
acceptance of adaptive control laws for operational use. 
Page 14 of 15 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
    Ultimately, the IRAC adaptive flight controls project contributed to the 
relatively small set of adaptive control flight data available to the flight-test 
community.  Such data provide additional aid to future control designers 
and their selection of the appropriate level of complexity for their 
application.  Furthermore, the flight-test data provide a better 
understanding of potential interactions between pilots and adaptive 
systems.  Lessons learned may offer improved safety involving further 
flight-testing of adaptive control laws. 
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